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ABSTRACT
Episodes of unanticipated inflation reduce the real value of nominal claims and thus redistribute
wealth from lenders to borrowers. In this study, we consider redistribution as a channel for aggregate
and welfare effects of inflation. We model an inflation episode as an unanticipated shock to the
wealth distribution in a quantitative overlapping-generations model of the U.S. economy. While the
redistribution shock is zero sum, households react asymmetrically, mostly because borrowers are
younger on average than lenders. As a result, inflation generates a decrease in labor supply as well
as an increase in savings. Even though inflation-induced redistribution has a persistent negative
effect on output, it improves the weighted welfare of domestic households.
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Inﬂation surprises are a salient characteristic of modern economies. Throughout most
of the inﬂation episode experienced by the United States along with other industrialized
countries in the 1970s, realized inﬂation exceeded prior expectations.1 More generally,
inﬂation volatility emerges as a key stylized fact in Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002), a
detailed study of more than 200 postwar high-inﬂation episodes in 92 countries. Surprise
inﬂation redistributes wealth from lenders to borrowers by reducing the real value of
nominal assets and liabilities. This redistribution effect is not taken into account in most
existing research on the welfare cost of inﬂation, which employs a representative-agent
framework (see, for example, Lucas 2000 and the references therein).
This study analyzes the effects of inﬂation as a redistribution shock, that is, an unantici-
pated wealth transfer between different sectors and groups of households. In particular,
we quantify the aggregate and welfare effects of a hypothetical ten-year inﬂation episode
on the U.S. economy, assuming that the only real effects of inﬂation are due to the reval-
uation of nominal assets and liabilities. The resulting welfare effects on individual co-
horts easily outweigh conventional measures of the welfare costs of inﬂation. Moreover,
the weighted welfare of domestic households improves—the opposite of what standard
monetary models predict. Redistribution alone also generates effects on economic aggre-
gates that are as large as those in representative-agent models with monetary frictions.
Another difference from standard models is that the effects of redistribution persist long
after the end of an inﬂation episode.
Surprise inﬂation affects households not only directly by changing the value of their nom-
inal positions, but also indirectly through changes in ﬁscal policy. Fiscal policy must
adjust in some dimension during an inﬂation episode, since the reduction of real govern-
ment debt presents the government with a windfall gain. We use our model to illustrate
how the welfare impact on households depends on how this gain is spent. For example,
we describe one policy scenario under which a majority coalition that includes all but the
richest households beneﬁts from a surprise inﬂation episode. The young net borrowers
in the coalition beneﬁt directly, while the government uses its gain to compensate old net
1Between June 1973 and June 1974 the CPI grew by 10.4 percent. For the same period, the median
inﬂation forecast among more than 40 professional forecasters interviewed for the Livingston Survey was
3.4 percent, and even the highest forecast was only 7 percent. Between June 1978 and June 1979, the second
oil price shock led once more to an inﬂation rate of 10.4 percent, much higher than the median forecast of
5.6 percent.
1lenders through higher social security transfers. Under this policy, the bill is paid by rich
old households and the foreign sector. The result suggests that the temptation for policy
makers to inﬂate might be greater than is commonly thought.
The starting point for our calculations is a fairly standard neoclassical growth model.
Households differ by age and labor productivity to generate a heterogeneous population.
The other important players in credit markets—the business sector, the government, and
foreigners—are also present. The model is calibrated so that its balanced growth path
matches key aggregate statistics of the U.S. economy, as well as properties of the wealth
and income distribution from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). In order to iso-
late the effects of inﬂation that are generated by wealth redistribution, we abstract from
monetary frictions.
We model an inﬂation episode as an unanticipated zero-sum redistribution of real wealth
that displaces the economy from its balanced growth path. Since a period in our model
corresponds to ten years, we calibrate the magnitude of the redistribution shock to the
present-value gains and losses from an inﬂation episode during which the inﬂation rate
increases by ten percentage points for a ten-year period. We estimate these gains and
losses along the lines of Doepke and Schneider (2006), who document nominal asset and
liability positions for different sectors and groups of households in the United States.
We consider different scenarios for the adjustment of expectations during an inﬂation
episode. This is important because surprising changes in inﬂation expectations—in ad-
dition to simple jumps in the price level—also entail redistribution through their effects
on nominal interest rates. The extent to which agents are exposed to changes in inﬂation
expectations depends on the maturity structure of nominal positions, which varies across
agents.
Despite the fact that inﬂation-induced wealth changes sum to zero across agents, the re-
sponses of winners (net borrowers) and losers (net lenders) do not cancel out. Among
households, the key asymmetry is that net borrowers tend to be younger than net lenders.
This asymmetry gives rise to two life-cycle effects. First, a reduction in the labor supply
of the young winners (that is, an increase in their consumption of leisure motivated by
an increase in wealth) is not offset by an increase in labor supply by the old losers, since
many of the latter are retired. Second, an increase in the savings of the young winners
is not fully offset by a decrease in the savings of the old losers, since young households
spread any gain or loss over more remaining periods of life than old households.
2In our calibrated model, the ﬁrst effect causes aggregate labor supply to decline by up to
2 percent in the decade after the inﬂation episode. The second effect increases the capital
stock by up to 1.3 percent above trend two decades after the start of the inﬂation episode.
The net result is a decline in output over the ﬁrst two decades after the shock of up to 1.2
percent relative to trend, followed by a smaller temporary increase. When viewed as a
redistribution shock, inﬂation has persistent effects because it leads to wealth transfers,
which are propagated through standard life-cycle behavior. This is in contrast to standard
models, where persistence requires long-lived rigidities.
The effects on the welfare of individual cohorts are large. Retirees lose the most and expe-
rience a decrease in their consumption of up to 14 percent relative to the balanced growth
path. Among the winners, consumption of the young poor and middle-class cohorts in-
creases by up to 6 percent. Overall, domestic households gainat the expense of foreigners.
Using standard weighted welfare measures, we ﬁnd that the aggregate welfare effect of
inﬂation on domestic households is positive, and larger in absolute value than conven-
tional measures of the welfare cost of inﬂation based on monetary frictions. We show
that this would be true even if foreigners were not affected by inﬂation, since the redis-
tribution effect tends to level the overall wealth distribution, which improves weighted
welfare. However, the losses incurred by foreigners substantially increase the positive
welfare effect.
Our analysis incorporates multiple ﬁscal policy scenarios for the evolution of government
debt and the method through which the government rebates its gain to households. The
aggregate effects of inﬂation are qualitatively similar in all scenarios. However, ﬁscal pol-
icy plays a key role in determining how many losers and winners from inﬂation there are
overall. Forexample, ifthe government lowers income taxes in response toits gain, young
winners from inﬂation tend to do even better. If the government increases social security
transfers, in contrast, most of the old losers from inﬂation can be fully compensated.
In the next section, we review the literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework.
The model parameters as well as the redistribution shock are calibrated to data in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, we use the calibrated model to analyze the economic implications of
the redistribution brought about by an inﬂation shock. Section 6 concludes.
32 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst comprehensive study of the redistributional
effects of inﬂation in a quantitative framework. However, a number of speciﬁc aspects
have been discussed in the existing literature. The surprise revaluation of nominal gov-
ernment debt is the focus of Bohn’s (1988) study of ﬁscal policy. Bohn considers a sto-
chastic model with incomplete markets where government debt is nominal. Nominal
debt provides insurance against the effects of economic ﬂuctuations on the government’s
budget. A negative productivity shock leads to an increase in the price level (through
the quantity equation), and thereby deﬂates the value of existing government debt. This
windfall enables the government to continue to provide its services without being forced
to raise taxes in the downturn. Nominal debt therefore serves as a mechanism that imple-
ments event-contingent insurance.2
Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1998) are also interested in the effect of inﬂation on gov-
ernment ﬁnances. For the case of Sweden, they conduct a thought experiment that is
similar in spirit to ours: what would be the present value change in the government bud-
get, as of 1994, if there was a permanent 10 percentage point increase in inﬂation? They
ﬁnd a sizeable effect, about as large as 1994 GDP. However, most of this effect is accounted
for by incomplete indexation of the tax and transfer system, as opposed to the direct de-
valuation of government debt. Despite the large positive impact on the government’s
budget, the authors conclude that the net social gains of the inﬂation policy are likely to
be negative. A key difference from our analysis (apart from the fact that we do not focus
exclusively on the government) is that we use a quantitative model to explore different
ﬁscal policy scenarios, rather than assuming that the tax and transfer system will remain
unchanged.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2006) examine the ﬁscal implications of currency
crises in three middle-income countries. They ﬁnd that devaluation of the dollar value
of government debt (an effect that is also present in our analysis) is a more important
source of depreciation-related government revenue than seigniorage, which is the source
emphasized by most standard currency crisis models. Neumeyer and Yano (1998) docu-
ment the effects of U.S. monetary shocks on other countries that arise from cross-border
2See also Bohn (1990b)for some empirical evidence on this mechanism, and Bohn (1990a, 1991)on open-
economy extensions. Barro (2003) compares optimal debt policies with indexed and nominal bonds, and
argues that if the government is subject to moral hazard, issuing nominal bonds for insurance purposes
may be undesirable.
4holdings of nominal assets, and argue that during the 1980s these were especially large
for Latin American countries.
A connection between inﬂation and the wealth distribution can also arise through asym-
metric incidence of the inﬂation tax. Erosa and Ventura (2002) observe that poor house-
holds hold more cash relative to other ﬁnancial assets than rich households do. They
rationalize this fact in a monetary growth model where access to credit markets is costly.
The poor then pay a disproportionate share of the inﬂation tax and are hurt more by in-
ﬂation. Since inﬂation acts like a nonlinear consumption tax—with higher rates for the
poor—it also encourages precautionary savings and thereby leads to a higher concen-
tration of wealth. Albanesi (2006) derives a positive correlation between inﬂation and
inequality in a similar model, where the inﬂation tax rate is set in a political bargaining
game. Since the poor are more vulnerable to inﬂation, their bargaining power is weak,
and the rich succeed in implementing high inﬂation. The key difference between the in-
ﬂation tax literature and our paper is that the former deals with the effect of anticipated
inﬂation on cash holdings. In contrast, we are concerned with unanticipated shocks on all
nominal asset holdings, of which cash holdings are only a small part.
Our study is also related to a large literature on the link between the earnings and wealth
distributions in the U.S. The key stylized fact that this literature has wrestled with is
that the distribution of wealth is much more concentrated than that of earnings (see
Budr´ ıa Rodr´ ıguez, D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull 2002 for an overview of the
stylizedfacts). Both modelswith dynastichouseholds(forexample, Aiyagari1994,Krusell
and Smith, Jr. 1998, Quadrini 2000) and life-cycle models (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
1995, Huggett 1996, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2004) have been explored. More re-
cently, several papers have combined features of these two setups by accommodating
both life-cycle concerns for saving and altruism (for example, Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez,
and R´ ıos-Rull 2003, De Nardi 2004, Laitner 2001).
The model used here is simpler than those in most of the above studies in that house-
holds face no uncertainty. In particular, idiosyncratic labor income risk, the typical source
of heterogeneity in the literature, is absent from our setup. Instead, all earnings hetero-
geneity is due to differences in deterministic skill proﬁles across types of households, and
wealth inequality is partly generated by preference heterogeneity. We choose this mod-
eling strategy in order to calibrate the model to observed features of speciﬁc groups of
households, as opposed to aggregate moments of the earnings and wealth distribution.
Furthermore, our environment allows us to compute transition paths, rather than just
5comparing steady states. At the same time, our model shares several broad themes with
existing studies. One is the importance of bequests for generating a group of rich house-
holds that holds most of aggregate wealth. In our model, agents with high earnings also
have a greater ‘warm glow’ taste for transfers to their children. This may be viewed as a
simpliﬁed version of the setups in Carroll (2000) and De Nardi (2004), who employ pref-
erences where bequests are a luxury good. A second model feature that helps reconcile
the different properties of the earnings and wealth distribution is the presence of a social
security system.
Our model also has two features that are not staples of the wealth distribution literature.
One is the explicit treatment of durables (both consumer durables and houses), which al-
lows a distinction between ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial wealth. In addition, we assume that
labor supply is endogenous, and we calibrate both earnings and wealth observations to
a cross section of data from the SCF. In this respect, we follow Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez,
and R´ ıos-Rull (2003). In contrast, most other studies work with an exogenous earnings
process estimated from panel data.3
3 The Model
This section introduces a theoretical framework that can be used to assess the economic
implications of redistribution shocks. We use an overlapping-generations model in which
people differ both by age and by “type,” where the types will later be calibrated to dif-
ferent groups of households in the U.S. population. Apart from predicting the reaction
of ﬁrms and consumers, the model will also allow us to analyze the role of government
behavior. In our baseline redistribution experiment, the government receives a windfall
through a reduction in the real value of existing government debt. We use the model as
a laboratory to explore different reactions of the government to this windfall, such as tax
cuts, higher government expenditures, or increased social security pensions.
Preferences
We consider an overlapping-generations economy in which consumers live for N +1
periods (from 0 to N). Every period, a cohort of size one is born. People derive utility
3We do not use panel data since, unfortunately, common panel data sets contain little information about
rich households, who are particularly prominent owners of nominal assets.
6from durable and non-durable consumption goods as well as leisure. The utility function





i ui(ci,s,t,d i,s,t, 1 − li,s,t)+vi(bi,s), (1)
where ci,s,t is non-durable consumption in period t (of a type-i consumer born in period
s), di,s,t is consumption of houses (i.e., durable consumption), li,s,t is labor supply, 1 − li,s,t
is leisure, and bi,s is the bequest left to the next generation.4 Preferences for bequests are
of the “warm-glow” type; that is, parents derive utility directly from the bequest given to
their children, as opposed to the children’s utility. We also assume that children are of the
same type as their parent.
The consumer receives a bequest inthe ﬁrst period of life, works for the ﬁrst N−1 periods,
and is retired during the last two periods. During retirement, the consumer receives a
social security beneﬁt from the government. Utility is maximized subject to the following
budget constraints:
ci,s,s + di,s,s + ai,s,s+1 =(1 − τs)ws φi,0li,s,s + bi,s−N, (2)
ci,s,t + di,s,t + ai,s,t+1 =(1 − δ)di,s,t−1 + Rt ai,s,t +( 1− τt)wtφi,t−s li,s,t (3)
for s<t<s+ N − 1,
ci,s,s+N−1 + di,s,s+N−1 + ai,s,s+N =(1 − δ)di,s,s+N−2 + Rs+N−1 ai,s,s+N−1 + trs+N−1, (4)
ci,s,s+N + ps+N di,s,s+N + bi,s =(1 − δ)di,s,s+N−1 + Rs+N ai,s,s+N + trs+N−1. (5)
Here ai,s,t are savings, τt is the tax rate on labor income, wt is the wage, φi,t−s is an age- and
type-speciﬁc skill parameter, Rt is the interest rate, and trs+N−1 is a social security transfer.
Notice that the social security transfer is indexed by the ﬁrst period of retirement, and is
t h es a m ei nb o t hp e r i o d so fr e t i r e m e n t .
In the last period, instead of buying houses outright, consumers rent the houses at price
ps+N. The rental units are owned by other households as part of their assets ai,s,t,a n d
the price of renting adjusts such that the return on owning houses is equal to the return
on other assets. Equivalently, we could have assumed that rental services are supplied
by a competitive industry that borrows money to build and rent out houses. We assume
4The explicit treatment of durables allows us to distinguish ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial wealth. The im-
portance of durables for understanding life cycle patterns in consumption and wealth has been stressed by
Fern´ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2001).
7that young people buy houses, since otherwise the model could not match the empirical
observation that a sizable fraction of households has positive net worth, but negative
ﬁnancial assets. At the same time, we assume that old people rent, so that we do not have
to introduce additional assumptions on what happens to the houses of people after they
die.
In a frictionless environment, owning a house and renting in a competitive market are
equivalent. For a part of our analysis, however, we are going to assume that households
face a borrowing constraint. In particular, households are only able to borrow up to a
ﬁxed fraction ψ of the value of their houses:
ai,s,t+1 ≥− ψdi,s,t. (6)
As long as ψ<1, a ﬁnancially constrained household would be better off renting housing
services in a competitive market instead of buying. We still maintain the assumption that
young households buy their houses, because this is the prevalent situation in the data.
This choice could be formally justiﬁed by introducing additional frictions (such as tax
advantages) that favor buying over renting.
Technology
There is a competitive industry that produces the (nondurable) consumption good from











Output can be transformed into either type of capital or into the durable consumption
good (houses) without adjustment costs. Both Kt and Et are owned by households and
rented to ﬁrms. Productivity zt grows at the exogenous and constant rate g:
zt+1 =( 1+g)zt.
Firms rent physical and intangible capital at the common rental rates Rt,a n dt h ed e p r e -
ciation rates are δK and δE. In equilibrium, both types of capital have the same expected
return. If in addition the two depreciation rates are the same (as they are in our calibra-
tion), the two types of capital can be aggregated, and the model economy will behave just
like the usual model with labor and physical capital only. Nevertheless, introducing in-
tangible capital is useful for calibrating the model; in particular, we will be able to match
8both the ratio of business capital Kt to output and the return to capital.
The ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions equate the marginal product on either type of capital to
the rental rate and the marginal product of labor to the wage rate. Due to the absence of
arbitrage, the net returns on both types of capital must also be equal to the interest rate.
We thus have:
Rt =1− δk + αρ
Yt
Kt
,R t =1− δE + α (1 − ρ)
Yt
Et





The government in our model economy taxes labor income and issues new government
debt Bt+1 to ﬁnance social security transfers, general government expenditures Gt,a n d
interest on existing debt Bt.T h e l a b o r t a x τt is linear, does not depend on the type of
the worker, and may vary over time. The social security system consists of lump-sum
payments trt−1 and trt to every adult who retired in periods t − 1 and t, respectively. The
period budget constraint of the government is:
Bt+1 + τt wt Lt = Rt Bt + Gt + trt−1 + trt. (8)
Notice that the size of each cohort of retirees is one, so that population size does not enter
on the right-hand side of the budget constraint. We do not assume that the government
is benevolent or maximizes any particular objective function. Instead, our strategy is to
calibrate government behavior in the balanced growth path to U.S. observations, and then
toexplore the consequencesofdifferent governmentpoliciesinreaction toaredistribution
shock.
In addition to the domestic consumers, we also allow for the possibility that foreigners
are investing in the domestic market. Similar to our treatment of the government, the
behavior of the foreigners will be taken as exogenous. The assets held by foreigners in
period t will be denoted aF,t. In the model economy, net exports are given by interest
payments to foreigners minus new foreign investment in domestic assets.
This completes the description of the main elements of our model. In Appendix A, we
provide the remaining market-clearing conditions, specify the rental market for houses in
more detail, and formally deﬁne an equilibrium.
9Redistribution Shocks
A redistribution shock is an unanticipated zero-sum redistribution of assets among the
agents in the economy that displaces the economy from its balanced growth path. In par-
ticular, suppose that the economy is still on the balanced growth path in period t.T h e
redistribution takes place among ﬁnancial assets saved in period t for period t +1 .T h e
generations affected by redistribution are thus all generations alive at the beginning of
t +1 . Since the shock is unanticipated, it does not affect decisions in period t.A g e n t s
begin period t +1with the asset position after the redistribution shock took place, and
adjust their behavior accordingly. We concentrate on a one-time shock: no further redis-
tribution takes place after period t +1 , and agents do not expect future redistributions.
This approach is designed to isolate the wealth effect of redistribution on individuals’
behavior.
The economic effects of the redistribution shock can be assessed by comparing the adjust-
ment path after the shock with the balanced growth path. When computing the adjust-
ment path, we have to take a stand on the behavior of the government and the foreigners
afterthe shock. Unlikehouseholds and ﬁrms, whose behaviorisruled byutility and proﬁt
maximization, the decisions of government and foreigners are taken as exogenous in the
model. We use simple parametric decision rules for these agents, and explore the sensi-
tivity of the results to the government’s and foreigners’ behavior by experimenting with
different rules. More speciﬁcally, in the analysis below we assume that the government
and foreigners target the ratio of their net asset position to GDP, either holding this ratio
constant, or adjusting it at a constant rate towards the original balanced growth path. In
t h ec a s eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t ,w ea l s oh a v et od etermine how the different components of
the government’s budget (tax revenue, pension payments, government expenditures) ad-
just. In the quantitative analysis below we explore a number of different assumptions on
this point.
Within the theoretical model, we do not take a stand on the origin of the redistribution
shock, or the precise mechanism through which it is implemented. In the case of an in-
ﬂation shock that we analyze below, a more direct interpretation could be given if we
distinguished between nominal and real assets, which are affected differentially by inﬂa-
tion. Such an extension, however, would not change the predictions of the model. Since
there is no uncertainty in the model, there is no meaningful distinction between nominal
and real. If we formally introduced both types of assets, and both were held in positive
quantities, agents would be indifferent between them in any equilibrium, so that any pro-
10ﬁle of nominal positions could be maintained as an equilibrium outcome. In particular,
there would be one equilibrium where the nominal asset positions exactly reproduce the
redistribution vector calibrated in Section 4 below, given an unanticipated change in the




We calibrate the balanced growth path of the model to aggregate statistics of the U.S.
economy as well as data on the cross section of households. We specify household het-
erogeneity in the model to match the empirical analysis of nominal positions in Doepke
and Schneider (2006). In that study, we sort households, by age of the household head,
into six cohorts: households under the age of 35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66–75, and above 75.
To match this sorting, we assume that a model period lasts ten years, with the youngest
cohort corresponding to ages up to 35 and the oldest cohort comprising those aged 76
and older. In Doepke and Schneider (2006), the top 10 percent of households by net worth
within each cohort are referred to as the rich households. The rest of the households are
then sorted by income into two additional groups, labeled the middle class (70 percent of
the population) and the poor (the bottom quintile of the income distribution). Consistent
with this breakdown, we distinguish three types of households in our model, indexed as
i = r, m, p, which are calibrated to match characteristics of the rich, middle class, and
poor groups in the data.
In order to choose values for household, technology, and government parameters, we
select a set of target moments. The parameter values are chosen such that the balanced
growth path of our economy matches each of these statistics. In most cases, there is no
one-to-one relationship between a moment and a particular model parameter. Neverthe-
less, it is helpful to distinguish three sets of moments, one for each sector. For households,
5Of course, it would be a much harder exercise to match the empirical nominal position proﬁles using a
stochastic model with nominal and realassets, in which an inﬂation shock is expected with some probability.
Constructing such amodel is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, given that, as long asthe proﬁles
are matched, the resulting redistribution would be the same, we conjecture that most of the ﬁndings from
our model would carry over to a more complicated setting. In particular, the post-inﬂation predictions
would be unchanged if after the realization of the shock there were no further uncertainty.
11the preference parametersand households’ skill proﬁles are chosen to match data on labor
earnings and wealth proﬁles of different groups of households. The technology parame-
ters determine the accumulation of tangible and intangible capital in the business sector.
Here we target the labor share, the return on capital, and the ratios of depreciation and
business capital to GDP. Finally, government behavior is calibrated in order to match the
ratios of tax revenues, social security spending, and public debt to GDP.
Preferences and Skill Proﬁles
A key requirement for the functional form of the utility function is to be consistent with
balanced growth. We therefore choose the following period utility function:
ui(ct,d t,1 − lt)=




and the utility derived from bequests is given by:
vi(b)=ξi
b1− i
1 −  i
.
The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of preferences over consumption and leisure is standard
in the real business cycle (RBC) literature. We also follow the RBC literature in choosing
the weight of leisure σi to match average labor supply to a target of 40 percent of the time
endowment (in other words, a working adult works an average of 40 hours per week out
of a total of 100 “disposable” hours, i.e., excluding sleep and basic maintenance). The pa-
r a m e t e ri sa l l o w e dt ov a r ya c r o s sg r o u p ss ot h a tw ec a nm a t c hl a b o rs u p p l yf o re a c hg r o u p
individually. Speciﬁcally, if all groups placed the same weight on leisure, the rich group
would work too little relative to the data because of their higher wealth. Furthermore,
having identical leisure weights would result in widely different labor supply elasticities
for the different groups.6 The elasticity parameters γ and  i govern risk attitudes and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We set γ to the standard value of γ =2 . Balanced
growth then requires that we set  i =1− (1 − σi)(1 − γ).
The utility weight η determines the expenditure share of durables (which we interpret as
houses). To calibrate η, we take two different targets into account: the ratio of residential
6In the calibrated model, the Frisch labor supply elasticity at average hours is essentially identical across
types, varying from 1.05 for the middle class to 1.10 for the poor. These elasticities are within the range of
existing empirical estimates, see Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). In particular, the values are well
below estimates for the elasticity of female and aggregate labor supply, but exceed estimates for continu-
ously employed males, which is appropriate since the model is formulated at the level of households.
12capital to physical capital in the National Income and Product Statistics (NIPA), which is
1.44 in 1989, and the ratio of nonﬁnancial wealth to net worth in the SCF data, which is 58
percent in 1989. The valuation procedures used in these two data sources are not mutually
consistent, so we cannot match both statistics at the same time. As an intermediate target
that takes account of both numbers, we target a ratio of 1.8 for durablesto physical capital,
which results in a 36 percent share of durables in net worth.
The parameter ξi determines the expenditure share of bequests. In the data, bequests are
highly concentrated among the richest groups of the population; the vast majority of peo-
ple do not receive signiﬁcant bequests at all. For example, Gale and Scholz (1994) report
that only 3.7 percent of households interviewed for the SCF in 1986 had received an in-
heritance, and households leaving or receiving inheritances had a net worth that is far
above average. We therefore assume that only rich people care about bequests, setting
ξp = ξm =0 . To calibrate ξr, we follow De Nardi (2004) and target the transfer wealth
ratio, which is the fraction of total net worth accounted for by transfers from other house-
holds, including bequests and inter-vivos transfers (but not college payments). Using the
estimate of Gale and Scholz (1994), we target a transfer wealth ratio of 60 percent.
The time preference parameters βi determine the amount of capital accumulation in the
economy, the steepness of lifetime asset and consumption proﬁles, and the relative net
w o r t ho fd i f f e r e n tt y p e so fh o u s e h o l d s . We use three different targets to set the βi:t h e
ratio of the measured capital stock to output in the business sector, which was 1.55 in
1989 NIPA data, the ratio of rich to middle-class net worth, which was 13.69 in the 1989
SCF, and the ratio of middle to poor net worth, which was 4.54. To match these targets,
we have to assume that the rich type is signiﬁcantly more patient than the other types.
This follows because the rich have a steeper asset proﬁle, and their share of total wealth
is much higher than their share of labor earnings.7
The skill parameters φi,n are chosen such that the cross-section of labor earnings in the
model’s balanced growth path matches observed earnings in the 1989 SCF. Notice that
because the balanced growth rate is positive, the cross-section of earnings is not identi-
cal to the lifetime proﬁle of earnings for a given type. In particular, the lifetime proﬁle
is steeper than the cross-section proﬁle, since wages rise over time. Before we can match
model earnings to data, a couple of steps are necessary to ensure a consistent measure-
ment of earnings in model and data. In the SCF, we observe labor earnings, business
7It is a well known fact that, in most countries, the distribution of wealth is much more concentrated
than the distribution of income; see also Carroll (2000).
13income, private business wealth, and other ﬁnancial wealth for each type and cohort.
The model does not distinguish between private business and other ﬁnancial assets; busi-
ness wealth in the data is therefore interpreted as a part of overall ﬁnancial wealth in
the model. Here, however, a potential measurement problem arises. Since in the model
there is just one type of ﬁnancial asset, by deﬁnition business wealth has the same rate
of return as any other type of ﬁnancial wealth. In the data, however, we see that the im-
plied returns on private business wealth (the ratio of business income to business wealth)
greatly exceeds the return on other ﬁnancial assets. We deal with this inconsistency by
assuming, perhaps realistically, that part of what is labeled as business income in the SCF
should actually be interpreted as labor income, since it is derived from running the pri-
vate business. We therefore construct earnings targets by adding observed labor income
and business income that exceeds the income implied by the return on ﬁnancial assets in
the model.8 This adjustment is important to match the earnings of the rich, who derive a
large part of their income from private business. Using ei,n for the SCF earnings of type
i and cohort n, bii,n for business income, bwi,n for business wealth, and R for the rate of
return, the earnings targets ˆ ei,n are:
ˆ ei,n = ei,n +[ bii,n − (R − 1)bwi,n].
The average level of earnings in the economy is a scale factor. We therefore normalize
the skills of the youngest poor cohort to one, and choose the φi,n to match the ratio of
the earnings of each type and cohort to the earnings of this group. Table 1 displays the
(relative) earnings targets, which are based on the 1989 SCF data.
Technology Parameters
The onlynon-standard aspect ofour technology i st h ep r e s e n c eo fi n t a n g i b l ec a p i t a l .S i n c e
investment in intangible capital is not measured as investment in NIPA, production Yt
and measured output are not identical concepts in our economy. To link model output






t + Gt = Yt − I
e
t.
We equate the right-hand side to the NIPA GDP for the business sector. This output is
either consumed or invested in physical (household or business) capital. As mentioned
8For the 56–65 cohort of the poor type, business income is negative on average. For this group, the
earnings target is based on labor earnings only.
14earlier, the ratio of business capital to measured output is matched to data by choosing the
time preference parameters of consumers. Given this ratio, the share of intangible capital
1 − ρ determines the equilibrium rate of return. Given our other calibration choices, we
ﬁnd that setting ρ =0 .5 leads to a return of 8.25 percent per year, which is close to the 8.4
percentrealannualreturn ontheU.S.stock marketcomputedbyJagannathan, McGrattan,
and Scherbina (2000) for the period 1945–1999. If we did not allow for intangible capital,
the model would imply a much higher, counterfactual return. The share parameter α
determines the fraction of output going towards compensation of capital and labor. Once
again, we cannot match α to the capital share directly due to the presence of unmeasured
output. The measured labor share of our economy is given by wtLt/(Yt − Ie
t),w h i c hw e
match to the observed value of 0.66 in the data. The depreciation rate on physical capital
can be inferred directly from NIPA. Given the observed NIPA rate for the business sector,
we select 7 percent per year, or δk =1− (1 − 0.07)10. We also impose that all depreciation
rates are identical, so that δ = δe = δk. Finally, the productivity growth rate g is set to
2 percent per year, which approximates the average growth rate of the real output per
person in the U.S. economy over the past century.
Behavior of the Government and Foreigners
The government parameters to be calibrated are the labor tax rate τt, the social security
transfer trt, and general government spending Gt. Given these choices, the interest rate
and productivity growth rate pin down the ratio of government debt Bt to GDP in the
balanced growth path. We choose τ to match the ratio of tax revenues to measured GDP to
its observed value of one-third. The social security transfer trt is chosen to match the ratio
of social security transfers to measured GDP, which is seven percent. Finally, Gt is chosen
to target the ratio of government debt to GDP. Our target measure of government debt
is the government’s net nominal position in 1989, as computed in Doepke and Schneider
(2006).9
Finally, we need to calibrate the asset holdings of foreigners. Consistent with the calibra-
tion to a balanced growth path, we assume that foreign asset holdings grow at the same
rate as output. The level of foreign assets is calibrated to the net nominal position of the
9An alternative strategy would be to choose Gt to target the ratio of (non-social-security) government
spending to GDP. However, following this strategy would lead to a counterfactually low ratio of govern-
ment debt to GDP. The reason for this discrepancy is that the model has just one rate of return, which is
targeted to match average stock market returns. Since in the real world government debt has a lower return
than equity, we cannot match the government spending ratio and the debt ratio at the same time. For our
redistribution exercise, it is important for the model to have a realistic ratio of public debt to private debt,
which is why we target the debt-to-GDP ratio.
15rest of the world in 1989, which is 13.23 percent of measured GDP. The complete model
parameterization is summarized in Table 2.
4.2 The Redistribution Shock
To calibrate the redistribution shock implied by an inﬂationary episode, we use evidence
on sectoral and household nominal positions in 1989 and 2001. In Doepke and Schneider
(2006), we document the distribution of nominal assets and liabilities in the United States,
combining data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Flow of Funds Ac-
counts of the United States (FFA). We include not only direct nominal asset holdings and
debt, but also nominal assets held indirectly (such as ownership of shares in a mutual
fund that holds nominal bonds) and debt owed indirectly (for example, through owner-
ship of a business that in turn has issued nominal debt). To capture the maturity structure
of nominal positions, we construct nominal payment streams: using data on interest rates
and maturities for several broad asset classes, we determine, for every sector and group of
households, a certain net payment stream that the sector or household expects to receive
in the future. The market value of this nominal position can be calculated by discounting
the nominal payment stream with the nominal term structure.
Now suppose that, starting from the end of a given benchmark year (i.e., 1989 or 2001),
realized inﬂation over the next 10 years is 10 percentage points higher than initially ex-
pected. Weestimate the present value gain or loss from such aninﬂationepisode for every
sector and group of households.10 Both the scale and the nature of redistribution depend
on how quickly agents adapt to higher inﬂation. We do not take a stand on exactly how
expectations are formed or portfolios adjusted. Instead, we construct two scenarios that
provide upper and lower bounds on redistribution. We provide a brief discussion of these
calculations here; a more formal description is contained in the appendix.
U n d e rt h eu p p e rb o u n d ,o rFull Surprise, scenario, we confront agents with a surprising
one-time jump in the price level that leaves nominal interest rates unchanged. Redistri-
10Implicitly, our calculations assume that redistribution arises only as the result of the current nominal
asset or liability positions that are documented in the FFA and SCF. In principle, additional redistribution
between the government and private agents could arise in the future if the tax and transfer system is only
imperfectly indexed, and does not change as a result of the inﬂation shock. We know, however, that the
government is a major winner from an inﬂation shock, which implies that ﬁscal policy has to adjust in some
dimension. Rather than incorporating future redistribution in the calibration of the inﬂation shock, we
therefore account for the role of the government by exploring different ﬁscal policy reactions in the model
simulations.
16bution occurs because a jump in the price level proportionally lowers the real value of
all nominal payments. The size of the jump is set to the total change in the price level
over the inﬂation episode (a cumulative increase of 172 percent over 10 years in our base-
line episode). In contrast, the lower bound, or Indexing ASAP, scenario corresponds to
a surprising one-time announcement that inﬂation will be 10 percentage points higher
than expected for the next 10 years. Bond markets immediately incorporate the revised
inﬂation expectations into the nominal yield curve. Redistribution occurs because future
nominal payments are discounted at higher interest rates. The present value gains and
losses are smaller here than in the Full Surprise scenario because any given position is not
affected by the change in the price level over t h ee n t i r ee p i s o d e ,b u to n l yb yt h ec h a n g eu p
to the maturity of the position itself. The Indexing ASAP scenario is equivalent to assum-
ing that agents switch to inﬂation-indexed securities as soon as their nominal positions
reach maturity, which accounts for the label. Quantitatively, this second scenario delivers
a lower bound for gains andlosses, since nominal wealth invested in a given instrument is
protected from any inﬂation that occurs once the instrument has matured. Qualitatively,
the Indexing ASAP scenario is special in that it affects longer positions more than short
positions.
Redistribution across Households
Table 3 summarizes the redistribution of wealth across sectors after the 10 percent inﬂa-
tion experiment, stated as a percentage of GDP. Due to its large nominal debt, the govern-
ment is the main winner from inﬂation, with gains between 9.1 and 20.8 percent of GDP
for a hypothetical inﬂation episode starting in 1989, and 6.2 to 17.4 percent for an episode
starting in 2001. Both the government and the rest of the world (i.e. foreigners) have posi-
tive nominal positions, and thus stand to lose from inﬂation. However, as documented in
Doepke and Schneider (2006), the foreigners’ exposure to inﬂation has quickly increased
through the 1990s. The potential losses from an inﬂation episodes were between 5.2 and
8.4 percent of GDP in 1989, but have increased to 8.0 to 12.3 percent in 2001. For house-
holds, in contrast, losses under the Full Surprise scenario have declined from 11.8 percent
of GDP in 1989 to 2.0 percent in 2001. Under Indexing ASAP, households actually stand
gain from inﬂation in 2001.
Table 4 considers redistribution within the household sector for the benchmark year 1989,
with gains and losses of the different household types stated relative to average net worth
in each group. In Table 5, the same gains and losses are expressed as a fraction of total
losses incurred by the household sector. Even within the household sector, the redistrib-
17ution effects are sizeable. In 1989, a coalition of relatively old households stands to lose
between 10 and 25 percent of GDP. Up to three quarters of the loss are born by the top
10 percent of the wealth distribution, who hold a lot of long-term ﬁxed-income securities.
However, poor agents who hold most of their savings as deposits are also vulnerable to
inﬂation. Within each wealth category, the largest losses are born by the oldest house-
holds, who are already in retirement. The main winners within the household sector are
young middle-class and poor households who bought a home and have large ﬁxed-rate
mortgages.11
Mapping the Shock into the Model
We map the redistribution totals for baseline year 1989 in Tables 3 and 5 into a redistribu-
tion vector in the model by matching (for each group) the ratio of the total wealth gain or
loss to measured GDP between model and data.12 Two different redistribution vectors are
used, one for the Full Surprise and one for the Indexing ASAP scenario. In the household
sector, the losses or gains of the cohort up to age 35 affect the initial assets of the cohort
36–45, losses and gains from 36–45 affect initial assets at age 46, and so on. The youngest
cohort under 35 starts with zero assets, and therefore does not experience a change in its
initial assets. The young rich, however, may receive a different bequest because of the im-
pact on their parents. The level of government debt and net asset holdings of foreigners
are adjusted as well. Since in the model the last cohort dies at age 85, there is no cohort
whose initial assets are affected by the gains and losses of the cohort aged 76–85. For
simplicity, we disregard the redistribution occurring in this age group.13
5 Findings from the Model
In this section, we use the calibrated model to assess the economic implications of the
wealthredistribution triggered byanunanticipatedinﬂationepisode. Asdiscussed above,
wemodel the arrival of inﬂation asaredistribution shock thatdisplaces the economyfrom
11Additional detail on the sectoral and household positions and redistribution numbers is provided in
Doepke and Schneider (2006).
12The redistribution in Table 3 does not add up exactly to zero because of data limitations; in each case,
we adjust the gain of the government to ensure a zero-sum redistribution.
13To maintain a zero-sum redistribution, we reduce the gain of the government by the amount of losses
in this cohort. We have also tried an alternative procedure in which the last cohort is interpreted as “open
ended” and receives a larger total redistribution. The results were very similar to baseline approach. The
main difference is a larger decline in the old cohorts’ consumption, with little effect on aggregates.
18its balanced growth path. The (zero sum) redistribution vectors that we feed into the
model have been calibrated in Section 4.2. As can be seen from Table 3, the government
is a major winner in the redistribution. We thus need to take a stand on how it will adjust
its behavior. If tax rates and real government spending do not change, the government
budget will be in surplus due to lower payments on existing debt, and the real value of
government debt will decline even further. Alternatively, the government could use the
extra revenue to raise government spending or to lower taxes. In the benchmark ﬁscal
policy regime, the government uses the extra revenue to raise government spending. The
real value of government debt returns to its balanced-growth value, so that we do not
induce permanent effects solely by imposing them on the reaction of the government. In
this regime, the gap to the balanced-growth debt/GDP ratio is assumed to shrink by 50
percent per decade. Alternative ﬁscal policy regimes will be considered below. We also
have to take a stand on the behavior of foreign investors, who lose from inﬂation. We
treat the foreigners similarly to the government, that is, we assume that the real value of
the foreigners’ assets returns to the balanced growth value over time.14
The Impact on Households
We begin describing the impact of the inﬂation shock by looking at individual groups of
households, leaving aggregates for later. Our baseline results are for a 10 percent inﬂation
experiment with baseline year 1989 and rely on the version of the model without a bor-
rowing constraint. Figure 1 shows the impact on the consumption of each cohort that is
alive at the time of the redistribution shock under the Full Surprise scenario. Consump-
tion is displayed as a percentage deviation from consumption in the balanced growth
path. Each panel shows the reaction of each cohort over their entire life cycle, and peri-
ods are labeled by their midpoint. For the cohort 76–85, for example, the inﬂation shock
hits only in the last period. The graph therefore shows a zero effect until age 70 (that is,
the decade 65–74), because for the oldest cohorts those ages are reached before the inﬂa-
tion shock takes place. The middle-class cohorts 36–55 and the poor cohort 46-55 enjoy
the largest positive effects, with a gain in consumption of up to seven percent relative to
the balanced growth path. These cohorts have a relatively large amount of debt (mainly
mortgages to ﬁnance houses), and inﬂation lowers the real value of this debt. The pre-
retirement cohorts of the poor and the middle class (up to age 65) and the poor and rich
14Using other assumptions (such as a permanent reduction in the foreigners’ assets) made little difference
to the results, and so we do not report them here. For the foreigners, we assume that 50 percent of the
gap to the pre-inﬂation net nominal position is closed per decade (the same assumption is used for the
government).
19aged 36–45 also gain, but to a lesser degree. Finally, the youngest cohort of the poor and
the middle class are winners as well, albeit for a different reason. These cohorts are not
directly affected by redistribution, but they gain from general equilibrium price effects. In
particular, a decline in total labor supply leads to a rise in wages.
Allothertypes and cohorts lose from the inﬂation shock. Theyoung rich lose becausethey
receive a smaller bequest; the others lose because they hold nominal assets that decline
in real value. The oldest cohort of the middle class takes the largest hit, with a decline in
consumption in excess of 14 percent. The old are disadvantaged in two different ways.
First, they hold large amounts of nominal assets, which exposes them to inﬂation. Second,
they are at or near the end of their life cycle, which implies that they cannot smooth the
impact on consumption by lowering savings. The impact on consumption of durables or
houses (not shown) is very similar to the impact on consumption.
Figure 2 shows the impact on labor as a percentage deviation from average labor supply
in the balanced growth path. With the exception of retired households, who have lost
this margin of adjustment, the losers from inﬂation compensate for the impact by work-
ing more, while the winners enjoy more leisure. Notice that the cohort with the largest
increase in labor supply is the pre-retirement cohort age 56–65 of the rich. These house-
holds have to use their “last chance” of adjusting, while younger households are able to
smooth their adjustment over several decades.15
Figure 3 shows the impact on savings. What is striking about this ﬁgure is the size of the
effects. The poor aged 46–55 increase their savings by up to 40 percent of their average
savings in the balanced growth path, while the households 66–75 experience a decline of
up to 17 percent.
The Impact on Aggregates
Figure 4 displays the effect on economic aggregates. Here period 0 is the impact period,
and effects are displayed for the ﬁrst ﬁve decades after the shock. The change in the
interest rate is displayed in basis points, and the effect on the other variables is given
as a percentage deviation from the balanced growth path. In each panel, the solid line
corresponds to the Full Surprise scenario discussed so far. In absolute terms, aggregates
move a lot less than type- and cohort-speciﬁc variables, indicating that the individual
15Given that the labor decision in the model concerns household labor supply per decade, many of these
changes are best interpreted as adjustments at the extensive margin. For example, some younger house-
holds may switch from having two wage earners to one in response to their gain, while for the cohort 56–65
the time of retirement is an important margin.
20effects partially offset each other. Nevertheless, a clear pattern emerges, which can be
related to the individual characteristics of borrowers and lenders in the economy. The
ﬁrst notable feature is a persistent decline in labor supply. This decline is driven by the
younger cohorts of the poor and the middle class, who proﬁt from a positive wealth effect
and choose to enjoy more leisure. The decline of labor supply is partially offset by the
rich and the old. The net effect is still negative, however, since a large fraction of the
losers from inﬂation are retirees, who are unable to adjust their labor supply. Hence, the
age structure of gainers and losers from inﬂation is key for the aggregate effect on labor
supply.
The evolution of the capital stock is driven by life-cycle effects as well. The capital stock
increases for two decades after the impact of the shock. The relatively young gainers from
inﬂation increase their savings, while the older losers have a smaller decrease in savings,
since theyare closer tothe endof thelife cycle. Thecapital stock continues to increase over
the ﬁrst decades, because the losers reach the end of their life cycle before the gainers do.
The poor and middle-class gainers from inﬂation are still alive after twenty years, and
their additional savings account for the high capital stock in this period. The effect is
reversed when the cohorts who initially had the largest gains reach the end of their life
cycle. After a number of decades, none of the cohorts that were directly affected by the
inﬂation shock remain, and the aggregate effects begin to peter out.
The net impact on output is a decline of up to 1.2 percent relative to the balanced growth
path during the ﬁrst two decades, and an increase of up to 0.5 percent thereafter. Notice
that while the effects are moderate in magnitude, they are extremely persistent. Given an
average decline of about 0.8 percent relative to the balanced growth path over the ﬁrst
twenty years, the cumulative amount of output lost is large. In addition, the output effect
is of the same order of magnitude as what is generated by representative-agent models
with monetary frictions. For example, Cooley and Hansen (1989) ﬁnd that in a standard
cash-in-advance model with stochastic money supply, a permanent increase in inﬂation
from 0 to 10 percent reduces steady-state output by about 0.8 percent (with a cash-in-
advance constraint that requires that the equivalent of one month of consumption has to
be held in cash). Our model, which abstract from monetary frictions, generates roughly
the same output effect over two decades based on surprise redistribution only.
So far, we have only considered the Full Surprise scenario. Under the alternative Indexing
ASAP scenario, assets and liabilities with maturities below ten years are affected less by
inﬂation, since nominal interest rates are assumed to adjust to the new expected inﬂation
21path right away. As Table 3 shows, under this assumption the net loss of the household
sector is only 4.0 percent of GDP, instead of 11.8 percent under the Full Surprise scenario.
Despite the lower total amount of redistribution, the economic effects under the Indexing
ASAP scenario are not just a scaled-down version of the Full Surprise results. The reason
is that the maturity structure of assets and liabilities differs across sectors and groups of
households.
In Figure 4, the effects of the Indexing ASAP scenario are given by the dotted lines. The
responses still have a similar shape, but are generally smaller. The initial impact on out-
put declines to 0.5 percent, but it is more persistent than in the Full Surprise scenario.
Additional insights can be gained if we decompose the overall redistribution experiment
into two components: redistribution among households, and redistribution among the
household sector as a whole and the government and foreigners. The dashed lines in
Figure 4 (“Indexed Debt”) show what happens in the Full Surprise scenario if we only
redistribute among households in the same amount as before, but isolate the government
and foreigners from the redistribution (i.e., we assume that the assets and liabilities of
the government and foreigners are indexed to inﬂation). In terms of labor supply and
output, this households-only redistribution leads to an even larger labor supply and out-
put effect. The reason is that if the government receives its windfall, the households are
poorer, while the demand for government consumption increases. Both effects increase
labor supply. Similar effects arise under the Indexing ASAP scenario (not shown).
We repeated both experiments in versions of the model with a binding borrowing con-
straint, i.e., consumers can only borrow up to fraction ψ of the value of their houses. We
experimented with a variety of values for ψ, but found that in each case the results were
virtually the same as in the model without ﬁnancial constraints. Intuitively, a borrowing
constraint will change the reaction of households who are right at the constraint when
the inﬂation shock hits. Since these households are borrowers, they gain from inﬂation;
that is, the real value of their debt declines. Compared to an unconstrained household, a
constrained household will spend alarger fraction of the windfallon additional consump-
tion in the impact period, since consumption was previously limited by the constraint. At
the same time, there will also be a larger increase in leisure, since a constrained house-
hold tends to increase labor supply to overcome the restriction. Quantitatively, however,
these effects turn out to be small. The reason is that only the youngest households are
ﬁnancially constrained, and these households account for only a small part of the overall
effects.
22Alternative Fiscal Policy Regimes
While our model makes precise predictions about the reaction of the household and busi-
ness sectors to a redistribution shock, we had to make assumptions about the reaction
of the government, which is a major beneﬁciary of the inﬂation-induced redistribution.
The question arises whether our results are sensitive to alternative assumptions about the
government’s reaction to the inﬂation windfall. To evaluate the role of the government,
we computed outcomes under a variety of ﬁscal policy regimes after the inﬂation shock.
In our model, apart from increasing government spending, the government may put ad-
ditional funds to two alternative uses: it could lower taxes, or it could increase social
security spending. The top panel in Figure 5 compares the impact on output across the
three possible “pure” policies, i.e., the entire windfall is used either to increase general
spending, lower income taxes, or increase social security. In each case, we use the Full
Surprise scenario; corresponding results for the Indexing ASAP scenario are displayed in
Figure 6. We maintain the assumption that real government debt returns to its original
balanced-growth value. The shape of the impact on aggregate output is remarkably sim-
ilar across the three policies. In each case, output initially declines due to the negative
effect on labor supply, and later increases due to the increased capital stock. Throughout
the entire transition, output is highest if taxes are lowered, and lowest if pensions are in-
creased. The intuition is that cutting taxes lowers distortions at the labor-leisure margin,
which increases output. Subsidizing pensioners, in contrast, lowers incentives for saving.
So far, we have taken as given that the effect of wealth redistribution on the government is
transitory, i.e., real government debt returns to its original balanced-growth value. How-
ever, the government could also decide to permanently keep government debt at its lower
post-inﬂation value, which would allow either a permanent increase in spending or a per-
manent decrease in taxes. The bottom panel of Figure 5 displays the output effects under
this ﬁscal policy regime. Since the economy now converges to a different balanced growth
path, permanent effects on output arise. Cutting taxes leads to the largest increase—about
three percent of output in the balanced growth path. Thus, in the long run, cutting taxes
increases output more than increasing government spending. Raising pensions has al-
most no long-run effect. Since pensions are paid late in life, in this case the lower govern-
ment debt is counteracted by lower private saving.
Welfare Implications
While the redistribution numbers computed in Section 4.2 give us a good indication of
23who gains and who loses from inﬂation, they are not sufﬁcient to determine the overall
welfare impact on each group. Households are also affected by the reaction of the govern-
ment to inﬂation, as well as by general equilibrium price changes. To gauge the impact of
inﬂation on group-speciﬁc welfare, Table 7 compares the utility of each type and cohort
of consumer alive in the impact period to balanced-growth utility in the Full Surprise sce-
nario under the three possible ﬁscal policy regimes, with government debt returning to
the balanced-growth value. Table 8 provides the same information for the Indexing ASAP
scenario. For ease of interpretation, the numbers are expressed as equivalent proportional
variations in consumption (both nondurable and durable). For example, an entry of -1.00
would indicate that the utility of the household in the inﬂation scenario is equivalent to
the utility gained from the balanced growth allocation, with consumption and housing
scaled down by one percent until the end of the life cycle. For people from the poor and
middle class groups who have reached the ﬁnal period of their life, the welfare number is
exactly equal to their percentage change in consumption. For younger people, this is not
the case, because they can also adjust leisure, and the old rich can adjust bequests. We also
display a weighted welfare criterion that places equal weight on each group alive in the
impact period.16 We discuss the results for the Full Surprise scenario ﬁrst; qualitatively,
the results under the Indexing ASAP scenario are similar.
The welfare calculations show that the ﬁscal policy regime determines the sign of the
welfare effect for a number of groups of households. In the baseline experiment in which
government spending adjusts, a majority of households lose from inﬂation. Speciﬁcally,
for all groups the sign of the welfare change is equal to the sign of the direct redistribution
effect in Table 4.17 The poor aged 46–55 gains most from inﬂation with a positive effect in
excess of 11 percent relative to the balanced growth path, while the oldest cohort of the
middle class suffers the largest welfare loss of over 14 percent. In this scenario, there is a
direct link between redistribution and welfare, because the government uses its windfall
to increase government spending, which does not enter anybody’s utility.
16While a formal political economy analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, our individual and ag-
gregate welfare measures correspond to the objective functions of two commonly used political economy
models, and in this sense indicate the “political popularity” of inﬂation. Under majority voting, each voter
picks the party whose policies yield higher utility. In this case, each group’s political preferences can be
read off the sign of the group-speciﬁc welfare effect. Probabilistic voting (see Persson and Tabellini 2000)in-
troduces noise to voting decisions, and it can be shown that voting outcomes are equivalent to maximizing
a weighted welfare function of the same type as our aggregate welfare measure.
17Recall that the gain or loss of a given cohort in the data affects beginning-of-period assets of the follow-
ing cohort in the model. For example, the gains or losses of the 36–45 cohort in Table 4 correspond to the
welfare effect on the 46-55 cohort in Table 7, and so on.
24The situation is different, however, if the government rebates its windfall to the house-
holds. If the government decides to cut taxes, the sign of the welfare effect stays the same
for all groups, but the absolute welfare gain increases substantially for the working-age
population. The largest gain now accrues to the middle class cohort aged 36–45, with a
positive welfare effect of almost 16 percent. If the windfall is used to increase pensions,
the sign of the welfare effect switches for a number of groups. A majority of households
now gain from the redistribution shock, including all of the poor. The oldest group among
the poor, which suffers a 5 percent welfare loss if the adjustment is through government
spending, now experiences a gain of 25 percent. For a number of groups (including this
one) the direct loss through the revaluation of their assets is more than offset by the com-
pensating higher pension payments. Thus, while the poor as a group experience a neg-
ative direct redistribution effect, this loss turns out to be easy to compensate, precisely
because it does not take much in terms of transfers to improve the well-being of the poor.
From a political economy perspective, these ﬁndings lead us to conclude that the govern-
ment can adopt simple ﬁscal policies in reaction to an inﬂation shock which imply that
the shock beneﬁts a majority. Thus, policymakers may be tempted to inﬂate the economy
not just because they take some direct interest in the ﬁscal position of the government, but
also because such a policy may actually have wide support if the losers from inﬂation re-
ceive some compensation. It is intriguing to observe that the U.S. inﬂation episode in the
1970s started right after social security was ﬁrst indexed to inﬂation in 1972. While this
policy change is unlikely to have been the main cause of the episode, it certainly lowered
the political cost of inﬂation, and therefore may help explain why it took a decade until
inﬂation was brought under control. In fact, the formula for the cost-of-living adjustment
of social security was originally speciﬁed incorrectly. The retirees were actually overcom-
pensated for inﬂation until 1978 (see Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenlees 1996), so real
pensions rose as a result of inﬂation, just as in our “Higher Pensions” ﬁscal policy regime.
The temptation of inﬂation becomes even more apparent when we consider the weighted
welfare measure, which is positive in each case. Under the Full Surprise scenario, the gain
variesfrom 2.5 percentifgovernment spendingis increased to5.7 percentifthe windfall is
put towards higher pensions. Under Indexing ASAP, the gains vary from 1 to 2.6 percent.
Three effects are at work here. First, the economy as a whole experiences a net gain,
because inﬂation deﬂates the wealth of foreigners. Second, a reduction in government
debt also registers as a welfare gain, since Ricardian equivalence does not hold in our
OLG-economy with distortionary taxation. Third, inﬂation redistributes wealth from the
25rich to the middle class and the poor. Since the rich have the lowest marginal utility, this
redistribution also has a positive impact on the weighted welfare measure.
We can gauge the relative importance of the taxation of foreigners by computing results
for an otherwise identical experiment that leaves the real value of the foreign asset hold-
ings intact. In other words, redistribution takes place only between domestic households
and the government, while the rest of the world is protected from inﬂation. To balance the
total redistribution, we assign a smaller gain to the government (i.e., the situation is as if
the position of the foreigners consisted only of inﬂation-indexed government bonds). In
thisscenario, the overall welfareeffect remainspositive, but issmaller. In theFull Surprise
scenario with government debt returning to the balanced-growth value, the weighted
welfare effects are 2.47 if government spending is increased, 3.74 with tax cuts, and 3.96
when pensions are raised. If the government windfall goes towards higher government
expenditure, the exclusion of foreign debt has no effect on welfare. The reason is that nei-
ther government spending nor the consumption of foreigners enter domestic households’
utility. In contrast, in the tax-cut and higher-pensions regimes, the implicit taxation of
foreigners contributes about 30 percent of the overall welfare effect. The welfare effect is
also positive if neither foreigners nor the government are affected by inﬂation, i.e., if we
consider redistribution among consumers only. In this case, the aggregate welfare effect is
t h es a m ea sw h a tw eg o tp r e v i o u s l yi nt h er e g i m ew h e r et h eg o v e r n m e n tp u t si t sw i n d f a l l
towards higher spending.
The welfare effects are essentially unchangedi fw ew o r ku n d e rt h ea l t e r n a t i v ea s s u m p -
tion that government debt does not return to the balanced-growth value. Even though we
saw that making permanent changes to debt and taxes can have a sizable effect on output
in the balanced growth path, this is of little relevance to the initial generations. The results
are also qualitatively unchanged if we consider the Indexing ASAP scenario (see Table 8).
Individual welfare effects are generally smaller due to the reduced redistribution volume,
but duration effects are important. For the poor, for example, losses are much smaller
under the Indexing ASAP scenario relative to Full Surprise, since most of their nominal
assets are short term. For the rich as well as for the government and foreigners, the dif-
ference between the two scenarios is smaller. Once again, the weighted welfare effect is
positive in each scenario.
When interpreting these results, one has to keep in mind that our model isolates the wel-
fare implications of only the redistribution effect of an inﬂation shock. The traditional
literature on the welfare cost of inﬂation, in contrast, builds on monetary frictions (from
26which we abstract), and ﬁnds that inﬂation lowers welfare. At the same time, the size of
the effects is generally shown to be small, so that the positive effects arising from redis-
tribution that we document here are likely to dominate. To give a concrete example, the
estimates by Lucas (2000) imply that a permanent rise in inﬂation from zero to ten percent
lowers welfare in steady state by the equivalent of slightly less than one percent of con-
sumption.18 In our analysis, as long as the government’s windfall is not used exclusively
to increase government spending (which does not enter utility), the positive weighted
welfare effect arising from redistribution is at least twice as large in absolute value as Lu-
cas’ welfare cost estimate. In the Full Surprise scenario, the positive welfare effect exceeds
ﬁve percent for both the tax rebate and pension policies. To be sure, the estimates are not
directly comparable, in that Lucas considers the implications of a permanent, but antici-
pated rise in inﬂation, whereas we focus on a surprising temporary inﬂation shock. Nev-
ertheless, for real world inﬂation episodes both redistribution and monetary frictions are
a relevant source of welfare effects. Here the conclusion remains that even if we account
for standard estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation arising from monetary frictions, un-
der suitable government policies the overall welfare effect of an unanticipated inﬂation
shock is positive and large.
Results for Baseline Year 2001
Doepke and Schneider (2006) document substantial changes in the net nominal positions
of different sectors of the U.S. economy over the last 15 years. Most importantly, there
has been a large decline in the net nominal position of the household sector, and a corre-
sponding increase in the position of the rest of the world. We repeated our experiment
with redistribution numbers generated from data in 2001 to gauge how important these
changes are for the effects of inﬂation. To make results comparable, we used the same
model calibration as before (apart from the asset positions of the rest of the world and the
government, which were adjusted to their 2001 values).
Figure 7 shows the impact on economic aggregates for the 2001 experiment. Qualitatively
and quantitatively, the effects are very similar to 1989 results. Some differences do arise,
however, when we consider the welfare implications. The weighted welfare measures
now show a slightly smaller positive effect of up to 4.57 percent in the Full Surprise sce-
nario with higher pensions (3.09 if spending adjusts, and 4.37 with tax cuts; the numbers
18The welfare cost of inﬂation is larger in economies where money is held to smooth consumption, and
there is a lack of other liquid assets that can serve this function (see Imrohoroglu and Prescott 1991 and
Imrohoroglu 1992), as well as in search-theoretic models of money (see Lagos and Wright 2005).
27for the Indexing ASAP scenario are 1.82, 2.24, and 2.33 in the higher spending, tax cuts,
and higher pension regimes). A key difference to 1989 is that the taxation of foreigners
now accounts for a larger share of the total welfare effect due to the increased net nominal
position of the rest of the world. The importance of foreigners can be gauged by recom-
puting the experiment under the assumption that foreigners are isolated from inﬂation
(as if, counterfactually, foreigners only held inﬂation-indexed bonds). This reveals that as
long as the government either cuts taxes or raises pensions, the inﬂation tax on foreigners
accounts for between 40 and 55 percent of the overall weighted welfare effect.
In summary, across all our experiments for both baseline years we ﬁnd that inﬂation-
induced redistribution has a positive effect on standard weighted welfare measures. Even
if we abstract from the fact that foreigners hold a sizable amount of domestic nominal as-
sets, these positive effects are large enough to outweigh standard estimates of the welfare
cost of inﬂation arising from monetary frictions. The large recent increase in foreign-
ers’ holdings of domestic, dollar-denominated debt, however, has made inﬂation an even
more attractive proposition from a U.S. perspective. In effect, foreigners are currently
lending large amounts of funds to the U.S. at terms of repayment that are under control
of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. Even moderate taxation of these funds through an
increase in inﬂation would result in substantial welfare gains for U.S. households.
While these ﬁndings depend on the speciﬁc distribution of nominal assets and liabilities
that we documented for the U.S., there is evidence to suggest that similar features may
have played a role in other historical inﬂation episodes. For example, concerning the
German hyperinﬂation of 1923, Holtfrerich (1986) ﬁnds that the distribution of wealth
was leveled, with the rich losing the most and the gains being concentrated in the middle
class. Moreover, “a signiﬁcant proportion of creditor’s losses arising out of the inﬂation
was borne by foreigners who had taken up creditor positions in marks. The losses these
suffered were of at least the same order of magnitude as German Reparation Payments
between 1919 and 1923.” (p. 333). Thus, despite the severe economic disruption caused
by the hyperinﬂation, the distributional impact may have been among the key factors that
rendered inﬂation attractive.
286 Conclusions
Thegoal ofthis paperwasto examinetheimportance ofwealthredistribution asa channel
for real effects of inﬂation. Building on the empirical work in Doepke and Schneider
(2006), we have computed the wealth redistribution that would be induced by a moderate
inﬂation episode. We ﬁnd that even moderate inﬂation leads to sizeable redistribution of
wealth. The wealth effects of inﬂation induce highly persistent effects on both individual
welfare and aggregate economic activity. The main source of aggregate effects is that
borrowers are younger than lenders. Standard life cycle considerations imply that the
responses of young winners and old losers are not offsetting.
Discussion of optimal monetary policy in the U.S. is often based on models with monetary
frictions, where inﬂation causes inefﬁciencies and therefore lowers welfare. Our model
abstracts from frictions to isolate the distributional effects of inﬂation. Based on U.S. data,
we show that the redistribution caused by an inﬂation episode tends to increase the wel-
fare of domestic households on average. This conclusion arises for two reasons. First,
inﬂation imposes a tax on foreigners who hold domestic nominal assets. If the foreign net
nominal position is positive, inﬂation creates a windfall from the perspective of domestic
households. Second, inﬂation tends to redistribute income from the relatively rich to the
relatively poor, which is also registered as an improvement by standard weighted welfare
measures.
Our ﬁndings therefore lead to some doubts regarding the conventional wisdom that low
inﬂation is always in the best interest of the domestic population. There is a sizable frac-
tion of the U.S. population which would stand to gain if another inﬂation episode such
as the one in the 1970s were to occur. As more and more nominal assets are held by for-
eigners, this fraction of the population continues to grow. Currently, the potential welfare
gains from taxing foreigners’ nominal assets through a moderate increase in inﬂation eas-
ily outweigh standard estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation. The current widespread
optimism regarding continued low inﬂation in the foreseeable future may be misplaced.
Wedonotmeantosuggest thatpolicymakers shoulduseinﬂationsystematically toachieve
distributional purposes. Clearly, a systematic policy of this kind would be impossible to
implement, since redistribution arises only to the extent that inﬂation is unanticipated.
At the same time, if the potential gains from inﬂation through redistribution are large,
policymakers may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to resist the temptation of inﬂation. Being aware
29of the potential redistribution effect may be important even if controlling inﬂation is the
ultimate aim.
To this end, our analysis may provide a useful starting point for future research into the
political economy of inﬂation. One ofour key ﬁndings is that the cohort welfare effects are
highly sensitive with respect to the ﬁscal policy regime followed by the government. Ifthe
government simply raises general spending, only young mortgage borrowers experience
a net gain from inﬂation, so that inﬂation would not be widely popular. If the windfall
is used to raise pensions, however, the poor as well as the old middle class are compen-
sated for all their losses, and most groups, apart from the very rich, stand to gain from
inﬂation. As we discuss above, during the 1970s the U.S. did have a policy of compensat-
ing retirees, since social security pensions were (perhaps inadvertently) over-indexed to
inﬂation starting in 1972. Our results suggest that this policy may have contributed to the
political sustainability of inﬂation. In future research, we plan to explore the role of ﬁscal
policies and redistribution effects in other historical inﬂation episodes.
30A Deﬁnition of an Equilibrium
To simplify notation, we deﬁne aggregate consumption, domestic assets, net exports, and
























[di,s,t − (1 − δ)di,s−1,t−1],
I
k
t =Kt+1 − (1 − δk)Kt,
I
e
t =Et+1 − (1 − δk)Et.
Here μi is the size of group i, and we have

i μi =1 . For the deﬁnition of an equilibrium,
we also need to specify the rental price of houses and the amount of assets committed to
housing the old. The houses rented by old people are part of the stock of assets owned by
other households. The rental price of houses adjusts such that the return to investing in
houses is equal to the interest rate. If the rent is pt per unit, investing in a house requires








The amount of assets Dt committed to housing the old is given by:









Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices {wt,R t,p t}, house-
holdallocations{ci,s,t,d i,s,t,a i,s,t,l i,s,t,b i,s}, foreigners’assets{aF,t},ﬁrmdecisions{Yt,K t,E t,L t},
and government decisions {Bt,τ t,G t,tr t} such that:
1. Givenprices,the decisionsofeverytypeand cohortofhouseholdsmaximizeutility(1)subject
to the budget constraints (2)-(5) and the borrowing constraint (6).
2. Given prices, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, i.e., (7) is satisﬁed in every period.
3. The government budget constraint (8) is satisﬁed in every period.
314. The rental market clears, i.e., (9) holds in every period.







t + Gt + NXt = Yt.







7. The asset market clears in every period:
At + aF,t = Kt + Et + Dt + Bt.
B Computation of Gains and Losses from Inﬂation
It is convenient to represent the computations underlying both of our scenarios as adjust-
ments to the nominal term structure, holding the real term structure ﬁxed.19 Let ın
t and rn
t
denote the total yields on n-year nominal and indexed zero-coupon bonds, respectively,
in the benchmark year t. Suppose that the Fisher equation holds ex ante in the benchmark
year, so that πn
t = ın
t −rn
t is cumulative expected inﬂation. Let ˜ πn
t denote the new inﬂation
path realized from t to t + n. We take the real interest rate to be equal to the nominal rate
minus realized CPI inﬂation, with the 2003 inﬂation rate used for expectations beyond
2003.20 The new inﬂation path is ten percentage points higher over ten years than the
initially expected path.





and losses, we revalue the payment streams associated with bonds and ﬁxed rate mort-
gages using this new yield curve. Consider a position that promises a single payment νt+k
in year t+k. The percentage loss on this position is 1−e
−(˜ πk
t −πk
t). The difference between
cumulative inﬂation paths is steeply increasing in maturity. This reﬂects the fact that the
Indexing ASAP scenario allows for implicit adjustment by agents towards indexed port-




t+k denote the (10−k)-year nominaland indexed forward
interest rates quoted at t, respectively and let ˜ π
t+10
t+k denote cumulative expected inﬂation
19The assumption that real interest rates do not move with redistribution is in line with the calibrated
model in Section 5, where the redistribution shock has only a small effect on the real interest rate.
20An alternative would be to estimate a time series model for inﬂation and use the forecast from that
model. However, since inﬂation is very persistent, the results would be rather similar, at least after the high
inﬂation of the 1980s.
32from t + k to t +1 0 . Since the Fisher equation holds after the announcement, the present





































In other words, once the payment is due at t+k, it may be thought of as reinvested at the
forward rate ˜ ı
10−k
t+k which fully incorporates future inﬂation. Equivalently, in real terms,
once the loss or gain from inﬂation up to t+k has been realized, reinvestment takes place
at the real rate.
The simplest way to think about the Full Surprise scenario is that all positions are multi-
plied by the same factor, e
−(˜ π10
t −π10
t ). It thus represents revaluation in hypothetical situa-
tions where either the ten-year inﬂation occurs in one day, or, equivalently, where agents
are not allowed to touch their portfolios for ten years.
Since the period length in our valuation framework is one year, the above discussion
applies directly only to positions with maturity of one year or longer. We make analo-
gous calculations for shorter claims. Under Indexing ASAP we assume that positions in
deposits, non-mortgage loans and short term paper—all valued at par in our valuation
exercise—can be adjusted within the ﬁrst year of the inﬂation episode. The idea is that
while it typically takes some time before loans can be repriced or deposits can be with-
drawn, agents will try to earn a different interest rate as soon as possible. We devalue
the par values by a six-month inﬂation surprise. Similarly, we devalue adjustable-rate
mortgages with a one-year inﬂation surprise. This captures the fact that, for most ARMs,
adjustment can only occur at speciﬁc times. Under the Full Surprise experiment, all po-




analogy, we also multiply deposit, non-mortgage loan, and ARM positions by that fac-
tor.21
21We assume indexing even on instruments for which current interest rates are zero, such as some check-
able deposits. This is in line with the role of the Indexing ASAP scenario as a lower bound.
33References
Aiyagari, S. Rao. 1994. “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109 (3): 659–84.
Albanesi, Stefania. 2006. “Inﬂation and Inequality.” Forthcoming, Journal of Monetary
Economics.
Barro, Robert J. 2003. “Optimal Management of Indexed and Nominal Debt.” Annals of
Economics and Finance 4 (1): 1–15.
Bohn, Henning. 1988. “Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt?” Journal of
Monetary Economics 21 (1): 127–40.
. 1990a. “A Positive Theory of Foreign Currency Debt.” Journal of International
Economics 29 (3–4): 273–92.
. 1990b. “Tax Smoothing with Financial Instruments.” American Economic Review
80 (5): 1217–30.
. 1991. “Time Consistency of Monetary Policy in the Open Economy.” Journal of
International Economics 30 (3–4): 249–66.
Browning, Martin, Lars P. Hansen, and James J. Heckman. 1999. “Micro Data and Gen-
eral Equilibrium Models.” Chapter 8 of Handbook of MacroeconomicsVolume 1A,e d i t e d
by John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Budr´ ıa Rodr´ ıguez, S., J. D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez, V. Quadrini, and J.V. R´ ıos-Rull. 2002. “Updated
Facts on the U.S. Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth.” Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 26 (3): 2–34.
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 2006. “Government Finance in
the Wake of Currency Crises.” Forthcoming, Journal of Monetary Economics.
Carroll, Christopher D. 2000. “Why Do the Rich Save So Much?” In Does Atlas Shrug?
The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, edited by Joel B. Slemrod, 465–84. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Casta˜ neda, Ana, Javier D´ ıaz-Gimen´ ez, and Jos´ e-V´ ıctor R´ ıos-Rull. 2003. “Accounting for
the U.S. Earnings and Wealth Inequality.” Journal of Political Economy 111 (4): 818–57.
Cooley, Thomas F. and Gary D. Hansen. 1989. “The Inﬂation Tax ina RealBusiness Cycle
Model.” American Economic Review 79 (4): 733–48.
De Nardi, Mariacristina. 2004. “Wealth Inequality and Intergenerational Links.” Review
of Economic Studies 71 (3): 743–68.
Doepke, Matthias and Martin Schneider. 2006. “Inﬂation and the Redistribution of Nom-
inal Wealth.” Unpublished Manuscript, UCLA and NYU.
Duggan, James E., Robert Gillingham, and John S. Greenlees. 1996. “Distributional
Effects of Social Security: The Notch Issue Revisited.” Public Finance Quarterly 24 (3):
349–70.
34Erosa, Andr´ es and Gustavo Ventura. 2002. “On Inﬂation as a Regressive Consumption
Tax.” Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (4): 761–95.
Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Jes´ us and Dirk Krueger. 2001. “Consumption and Saving over
t h eL i f eC y c l e :H o wI m p o r t a n ta r eC o n s u m er Durables?” Unpublished Manuscript,
University of Pennsylvania.
Fischer, Stanley, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos A. Vegh. 2002. “Modern Hyper- and High
Inﬂations.” Journal of Economic Literature 40 (3): 837–80.
Gale, William G. and John Karl Scholz. 1994. “Intergenerational Transfers and the Accu-
mulation of Wealth.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (4): 145–60.
Holtfrerich, Carl-Ludwig. 1986. The German Inﬂation 1914–1923: Causes and Effects in
International Perspective. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes. 1995. “Precautionary
Saving and Social Insurance.” Journal of Political Economy 103 (2): 360–99.
Huggett, Mark. 1996. “Wealth Distribution in Life-Cycle Economies.” Journal of Monetary
Economics 38 (3): 469–94.
Imrohoroglu, Ayse. 1992. “The Welfare Cost of Inﬂation under Imperfect Insurance.”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16 (1): 79–91.
Imrohoroglu, Ayse and Edward C. Prescott. 1991. “Evaluating the Welfare Effects of
Alternative Monetary Arrangements.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly
Review 15 (3): 3–10.
Jagannathan, Ravi, Ellen R. McGrattan, and Anna Scherbina. 2000. “The Declining U.S.
Equity Premium.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 24 (4): 3–19.
Krusell, Per and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. 1998. “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the
Macroeconomy.” Journal of Political Economy 106 (5): 867–896.
Lagos, Ricardo and Randall Wright. 2005. “A Uniﬁed Framework for Monetary Theory
and Policy Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (3): 463–84.
Laitner, John. 2001. “Secular Changes in Wealth Inequality and Inheritance.” Economic
Journal 111 (474): 691–721.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 2000. “Inﬂation and Welfare.” Econometrica 68 (2): 247–74.
Neumeyer, Pablo Andres and Makoto Yano. 1998. “Cross Border Nominal Assets and
International Monetary Dependence.” Unpublished Manuscript, Universidad T. Di
Tella and Keio University.
Persson, Torsten and Guido E. Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic
Policy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Persson, Mats, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson. 1998. “Debt, Cash Flow and
Inﬂation Incentives: A Swedish Example.” In The Debt Burden and Its Consequences for
Monetary Policy, edited by Guillermo Calvo and Mervyn King, 28–62. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.
35Quadrini, Vincenzo. 2000. “Entrepreneurship, Saving and Social Mobility.” Review of
Economic Dynamics 3 (1): 1–40.
Storesletten, Kjetil, Christopher I. Telmer, and Amir Yaron. 2004. “Consumption and
Risk Sharing over the Life Cycle.” Journal of Monetary Economics 51 (3): 609–33.
36Table 1: Relative Earnings Targets
≤35 36–45 46–55 56–65
Poor 1.00 1.79 1.37 0.21
Middle Class 6.15 9.84 10.02 5.61
Rich 10.25 21.29 17.38 12.84
Table 2: Calibrated Parameter Values
Preferences Skills Technology Government
γ =2 φr,0 =9 .91 φm,0 =8 .28 φp,0 =1 .00 α =0 .41 τ =0 .5
σr =0 .56 φr,1 =1 9 .88 φm,1 =1 0 .75 φp,1 =1 .60 ρ =0 .5 tr =0 .12
σm =0 .60 φr,2 =2 4 .20 φm,2 =1 1 .10 φp,2 =1 .54 δ =0 .52
σp =0 .53 φr,3 =3 3 .42 φm,3 =8 .67 φp,3 =1 .04 δK =0 .52
η =0 .16 φr,4 =0 φm,4 =0 φp,4 =0 δE =0 .52




37Table 3: Wealth Redistribution Across Sectors After 10 Percent Inﬂation Experiment
All Households
Government Rest of World Total Losses Gains
Year FS IA FS IA FS IA FS IA FS IA
1989 +20.8 +9.1 −8.4 −5.2 −11.8 −4.0 −24.5 −9.7 +12.7 +5.7
2001 +17.4 +6.2 −12.3 −8.0 −2.0 +1.6 −13.2 −6.2 +11.2 +7.8
Note: Gain or loss of each sector after 10 percent inﬂation experiment as a percentage of U.S. GDP under
two scenarios, Full Surprise (FS) and Indexing ASAP (IA), and for two baseline years (start of the inﬂation
episode), 1989 and 2001.
Table 4: 1989 Wealth Redistribution Across Households After 10 Percent Inﬂation Experi-
m e n tR e l a t i v et oA v e r a g eN e tW o r t hi nE a c hG r o u p
Poor Middle Rich
Age Cohort FS IA FS IA FS IA
≤35 +23.1 +0.5 +72.0 +31.8 +8.8 +3.6
36–45 +21.4 +6.9 +20.0 +9.7 −2.4 −1.5
46–55 +3.5 +0.9 +2.9 +1.6 −4.2 −2.7
56–65 −4.7 −0.9 −8.9 −2.7 −10.2 −4.0
66–75 −11.0 −2.3 −15.9 −4.6 −10.5 −4.8
>75 −16.7 −1.9 −24.1 −4.6 −17.4 −7.9
Note: Gain or loss after 10 percent inﬂation experiment as a percentage of average net worth in each group
under two scenarios, Full Surprise (FS) and Indexing ASAP (IA), for baseline year 1989.
38Table 5: 1989 Wealth Redistribution Across Households After 10 Percent Inﬂation Experi-
ment Relative to Total Loss of Household Sector
All Poor Middle Rich
Age Cohort FS IA FS IA FS IA FS IA
≤35 +29.1 +31.2 +0 . 5 +0.0 + 22.0 +24.3 +6 . 6 +6.9
36–45 +15.8 +17.5 +1 . 7 +1.3 + 17.7 +21.7 −3.6 −5.6
46–55 −4.6 −8.7 +0 . 3 +0.2 +3 . 2 +4.3 −8.0 −13.1
56–65 −29.0 −26.6 −0.3 −0.1 −9.2 −7.1 −19.5 −19.3
66–75 −32.3 −31.1 −0.5 −0.3 −13.7 −10.0 −18.1 −20.8
>75 −27.2 −23.7 −0.6 −0.2 −10.2 −4.9 −16.4 −18.7
All Ages −48.2 −41.4 +1 . 1 +0.9 +9.8 +28.3 −59.0 −70.6
Note: Gain or loss after 10 percent inﬂation experiment as a percentage of total loss of household sector
under two scenarios, Full Surprise (FS) and Indexing ASAP (IA), for baseline year 1989. Losses across
classes and age cohorts sum to −100.
Table 6: 2001 Wealth Redistribution Across Households After 10 Percent Inﬂation Experi-
ment Relative to Total Loss of Household Sector
All Poor Middle Rich
Age Cohort FS IA FS IA FS IA FS IA
<35 + 29.4 + 38.3 +1 . 5 +1 . 3 + 23.9 + 29.3 +4 . 0 +7 . 8
36–45 + 41.6 + 64.8 +2 . 2 +2 . 6 + 34.4 + 53.0 +4 . 9 +9 . 2
46–55 +8 . 8 + 15.7 +1 . 8 +1 . 6 + 12.4 + 20.5 −5.4 −6.4
56–65 −29.8 −36.1 − 0.0 − 0.2 − 5.4 −7.3 − 24.4 −28.6
66–75 −37.2 −36.3 − 0.1 − 0.1 − 14.3 −11.0 − 22.9 −25.3
>75 −27.6 −21.2 − 0.8 − 0.1 − 14.1 −7.6 − 12.7 −13.5
All Ages −14.8 +25.2 +4 . 6 +5 . 1 + 36.9 + 76.9 −56.5 −56.8
Note: Gain or loss after 10 percent inﬂation experiment as a percentage of total loss of household sector
under two scenarios, Full Surprise (FS) and Indexing ASAP (IA), for baseline year 2001. Losses across
classes and age cohorts sum to −100.
39Table 7: Welfare Effects based on Redistribution in 1989 for Different Fiscal Policy
Regimes, Full Surprise Scenario, Public Debt Returns to Steady State
Higher Spending Tax Cuts Higher Pensions
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 +0.71 +0.95 −2.44 +4.61 +5.39 −0.97 +0.96 +0.97 −2.17
36–45 +4.24 +10.98 +3.94 +7.97 +15.85 +5.07 +5.19 +11.24 +4.09
46–55 +11.59 +8.77 −3.45 +13.61 +12.86 −2.92 +14.32 +9.50 −3.29
56–65 +1.07 +1.28 −4.76 +1.59 +3.54 −4.43 +9.70 +3.65 −4.52
66–75 −2.32 −6.92 −7.57 −2.24 −6.64 −7.26 +31.23 +4.35 −6.91
> 75 −4.95 −14.18 −6.72 −4.62 −13.72 −5.98 +25.07 −2.62 −6.32
Total 2.47 5.30 5.68
Table 8: Welfare Effects based on Redistribution in 1989 for Different Fiscal Policy
Regimes, Indexing ASAP Scenario, Public Debt Returns to Steady State
Higher Spending Tax Cuts Higher Pensions
Age Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich Poor Middle Rich
≤35 +0.28 +0.37 −1.08 +2.23 +2.58 −0.37 +0.41 +0.38 −0.95
36–45 +0.23 +4.78 +1.69 +2.11 +7.21 +2.27 +0.69 +4.90 +1.77
46–55 +3.71 +4.24 −1.79 +4.76 +6.29 −1.57 +4.99 +4.59 −1.71
56–65 +0.21 +0.75 −2.71 +0.46 +1.87 −2.59 +4.49 +1.93 −2.60
66–75 −0.50 −2.22 −3.02 −0.46 −2.08 −2.87 +16.20 +3.38 −2.70
> 75 −1.09 −4.19 −3.05 −0.92 −3.94 −2.68 +13.78 +1.52 −2.86






















































































































Figure 1: Impact on Lifetime Consumption, in Percent Deviation from Balanced Growth




















































































































Figure 2: Impact on Lifetime Labor Supply, in Percent Deviation from Average Labor
























































































































Figure 3: Impact on Lifetime Savings, in Percent Deviation from Average Savings on Bal-
anced Growth Path, based on Redistribution in 1989, Full Surprise Scenario











































































Figure 4: Impact on Economic Aggregates, in Basis Points (Interest Rate) and Percent
Deviation from Balanced Growth Path (other Variables), based on Redistribution in 1989







































Figure 5: Impact on Aggregate Output by Policy Experiment, in Percent Deviation from
Balanced Growth Path, based on Redistribution in 1989, Full Surprise Scenario







































Figure 6: Impact on Aggregate Output by Policy Experiment, in Percent Deviation from
Balanced Growth Path, based on Redistribution in 1989, Indexing ASAP Scenario













































































Figure 7: Impact on Economic Aggregates, in Basis Points (Interest Rate) and Percent
Deviation from Balanced Growth Path (other Variables), based on Redistribution in 2001
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